

SCC4 Debriefing — Forensics

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COMPUTER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM

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74 75 74 65 20 6f 66 20 54 65 63 68 6e 6f 6c 6f 67 79 2c 43 3d 44 45 0a
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 53 75 62 6a 65 63 74 20 20 20 20 20 20 50 75 62 6c 69 63 20 4b
65 79 20 49 6e 66 6f 3a 0a 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 50 75 62 6c 69 63 20 4b
6c 69 63 20 4b 65 79 20 41 6c 67 6f 72 69 74 68 6d 3a 20 72 73 61 45 6e
63 72 79 70 74 69 6f 6e 0a 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 50 75 62
20 50 75 62 6c 69 63 20 4b 65 79 3a 20 28 32 30 34 38 20 62 69 74 29 0a
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 4d 6f 64 75 6c 75 73 20
28 32 30 34 38 20 62 69 74 29 3a 0a 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 30 30 3a 64 61 3a 33 66 3a 39 31 3a 31 33 3a 39
39 3a 61 66 3a 32 31 3a 38 36 3a 35 36 3a 31 32 3a 34 3a 3a 62 63 3a 35
63 3a 61 33 3a 0a 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
20 20 61 30 3a 39 35 3a 64 37 3a 64 35 3a 64 33 3a 33 36 3a 30 66 3a 33
34 3a 39 35 3a 32 33 3a 35 66 3a 62 34 3a 64 33 3a 64 62 3a 62 66 3a 0a

IT-CERT@KIT-CERT.0@k... 1260759644,956841 topserver: status: 1/40
IT-CERT.0@Karlsruhe Insti... 1260759644,956841 topserver: pid 9516 from 192
ute of Technology,CoDE,1... Subject Public Ki... 1260759644,956865 topserver: ok 9516 0:192.168
Key Info: Publi... 1260759644,956543 topserver: end 9516 status 0
lic Key Algorithm: rsaEn... 1260759644,956559 topserver: status: 0/40
ryption, RSAR... 1260759644,956772 topserver: status: 1/40
Public Key: (2048 bit),1... 1260759644,977079 topserver: pid 9517 from 192
Modulus |... 1260759644,977247 topserver: ok 9517 0:192.168
|(2048 bit):, |... 1260759644,977247 topserver: ok 9517 0:192.168
| 00:da:3f:91:13:91... 1260759644,980919 topserver: end 9517 status 0
19:af:21:86:56:12:44:bc:51... 1260759644,981024 topserver: status: 0/40
|c:a3:, |... 1260759644,981024 topserver: status: 0/40
| a0:95:d7:d6:d3:36:0f:31... fmail/delivermail: 1260759646,434463 fetchmail: a
|4:95:23:6f:b4:d3:d7:bf:, | 46 2009
fmail/delivermail: 1260759647,463701 1 message fo

P printserver.howe.sdhs.de.30203 > 192.168.1.255.30202: UDP, length 16
P printserver.howe.sdhs.de.7303 > 255.255.255.255.7303: UDP, length 173
P printserver.howe.sdhs.de.7303 > 255.255.255.255.7303: UDP, length 173

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This talk addresses the following questions:

- Why forensic analysis?
- Where and how to gather evidence?
- How to analyze evidence data?

It does *not* address:

- How to contain damage?
- What to communicate when to whom?
- How to recover from an incident?

What Is Forensic Analysis Good For?

To assess and answer several important questions about an incident:

- Where did the attacker come from?
- How was access gained?
- What damage was done?
- What other machines were affected?
- ... and many more related questions.

Case Study: SSC4 Situation

- Known facts for Security Service Challenge 4:
 - IP addresses 192.108.46.248 and 195.140.243.2 are evil.
 - (End of list!)
- Unknown: Everything else, particularly
 - Are the bad IPs involved with our systems?
 - If so, how?
 - And what happened, if anything?

- Broad classes of data sources:
 1. Highly volatile (e. g., CPU registers),
 2. Volatile (e. g., RAM),
 3. Static (e. g., hard drives), and
 4. Highly static (e. g., archive tapes).
- More volatile evidence must be gathered and preserved first, if possible.
- Obviously, not all classes available or applicable in every instance.

Back to SSC4: Initial Investigation

- First step: Find out whether the IPs in question have shown up at our site.
- Sifting through the appropriate logs yields a machine connected with the suspect IPs (boring).
- Watch out for timestamps (time zone used)!

So We Have a Suspect ...

... or at least a suspect machine. Now what to do?

1. Identify the suspect processes.
2. Gather all volatile evidence.
3. Gather less volatile evidence.
4. Work out what happened.

How to find suspect processes?

- Why, with `ps`, of course.
- ... and with `netstat`.
- ... and with `lsof`.
- Watch out for
 - processes with weird process names,
 - processes that belong to the `init` process,
 - processes that hold suspect network sockets or connections.

Process was quickly identified (no stealth measures).

- Process belonged to a job submitted with a user certificate with the DN

`/O=XXX/O=XXX/O=XXX/CN=XXX` (SSC4).

- Next step: collect all available information, using for instance the following tools:

`arp, gdb, ip, ipcs, last, lastlog, lsof, mount, netstat, ps, w, who`

Volatile process data to be secured includes:

- The executable binary of the process being executed,
- the core dump of the process,
- environment variables and settings, such as
 - the current working directory,
 - shared memory regions,
 - limits, and
 - open file handles.

And also save some static data:

- All related log files:
 - Machine,
 - gateways,
 - servers,
 - NATs,
- the user's home directory (watch out for privacy though!),
- actually, if possible, the entire file system.

Take a close look at the collected data. Some pointers:

- Inspect suspect executables (with, for example, `strings`, `hexdump`, `gdb`, `rec`, or more sophisticated disassemblers like `IDAPro` if available).
- Look at core dumps (using `gdb`).
- Grep through log files and the like.
- Check files' MD5 sums against the known-good list (you have one, right?).
- Perform further filesystem analysis, for instance with `autopsy` or `rkhunter`.

- Running the binary through `strings` reveals some fishy strings in the binary:
`JOIN, NICK, PONG, PRIVMSG, USER`
- Disassembling yields information about:
 - Communication and
 - other activity.
- Inspecting the core dump gives actual ID strings used in communication.

After detailed analysis, the following facts were known:

- Binary was an IRC bot (communication endpoints and parameters known),
- (tried to) install
 - at job and
 - cron jobto become persistent, and
- (tried to) transfer `/etc/passwd` out to drop site, but
- no root exploit used and no root kit installed.

Things to watch out for when doing forensics:

- Modifying evidence while collecting (e. g., file access times).
- Dropping volatile evidence (e. g., memory content).
- Failing to document actions properly (timestamps!).

Common sense and good practices:

- Strictly separate evidence acquisition and evaluation.
- Gather evidence, then produce a working copy of the evidence locker, then work on the working copy only.
- Go out of your way to ensure you work in read-only mode whenever possible, even on the working copy.
- And, most importantly, if you are unsure what to do, talk to somebody who has a better chance of knowing (i. e., EGI CSIRT).

Th-Th-Th-Th-Th-... That's All, Folks!

Any questions?

Th-Th-Th-Th-Th-... That's All, Folks!

Thank you for your attention!